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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, a
division of Gibbons & Reed,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. 19771

-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
politic,
Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover from Salt Lake County the value
of concrete materials sold not to Salt Lake County but to David
Pearce Construction, a subcontractor engaged by the owner-developer
of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision, which materials were
used in the curbs and gutters in said subdivision but which were
not paid for by the subcontractor to whom they were sold.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court without a jury with the
Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge, presiding.
judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

From a

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in
plaintiff-respondent's favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The genesis of this case arises out of a residential subdivision development in Salt Lake County.

The owners-developers

of the particular subdivision were not parties to the proceeding
in the lower court nor are they parties to this appeal.

The only

parties both in the lower court proceeding and in this appeal are
plaintiff now respondent, Concrete Products Company, a manufacturer and distributor of concrete products, and, defendant now
appellant, Salt Lake County, the political entity of the State of
Utah which approved the said subdivision (R. 81-82).
Sometime prior to November 16, 1976, Clealon Mann, a land
developer, submitted a linen plat for a proposed residential
subdivision development at approximately 3835 South and 5780 West
in Salt Lake County, Utah, to Salt Lake County for the approval of
and subsequent recording of said subdivision plat with the County
Recorder.

The County, however, would not approve or permit the

recording of the subdivision plat until the "developer" either
installed at "developer's" expense certain required subdivision
improvements, including curb and gutter, or in the alternative,
made provision to guarantee the installation of the required
subdivision improvements at "developer's" expense.
The owner-developer of the said subdivision designated as
Larsen Estates Phase III then did make provision to guarantee the
installation of the required subdivision improvements within a

period of two years by entering into an Agreement with Salt Lake
County (copy at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141) by which guarantee he assigned unto Salt Lake County his interest in an escrow
account he had established with Western Mortgage Loan Association.
This Agreement was made and entered into pursuant to the provisions of Section 19-5-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County providing in pertinent part that:
M

In lieu of the actual completion of the
improvements...the subdivider may file with
the county commission a surety or cash boncf,
escrow agreement or letter of credit in an
amount specified by the commission to assure
actual construction of such improvements'
within a two year period...." (Emphasis
supplied).
After the aforesaid guarantee was furnished by the developer, the Board of County Commissioners then, on January 19,
1977, approved the proposed residential subdivision plat; and,
that approved plat was thereafter recorded in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder on January 20, 1977, as Entry No.
2900210 in Book 77-1 at Page 12.

The Owner's Dedication on said

subdivision plat states in pertinent part:
"...we, the undersigned owners of the above
described tract of land, having caused same
to be subdivided into lots and streets to be
known as the
LARSEN ESTATES, PHASE III
do hereby dedicate to perpetual use of the
public all parcels of land shown on the plat
as intended for public use."
The concrete materials for which plaintiff-respondent was
awarded judgment in the lower court were furnished on or before
May 11, 1979 and had a value of $1,637.09.

(R. 132, R. 220).

They were sold by plaintiff-respondent not to Salt Lake County
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but to David Pearce Construction (R. 117, R. 129), a subcontractor
who was engaged by the owner-developer of the Larsen Estates Phase
III subdivision.

They were used for curb and gutter on property

dedicated for perpetual use of the public as set forth in the
Owner's Dedication on the subdivision plat.

The curb and gutter

improvements were required by Salt Lake County as a condition for
its final approval of said proposed subdivision (R. 129-130)
pursuant to the express requirements of Section 19-5-1 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
M

Sec. 19-5-1. Required Improvements.
No final plat of a subdivision of land shall
be recorded, except as provided in subsection
19-2-2, without receiving a statement signed
by the county engineer certifying that the
improvements described in the subdivider's
plans and specifications have been completed,
that they meet the minimum requirements of
all ordinances of the county, that they
comply with the following recommendations of
the Salt Lake City-County board of health,
the flood control division, the planning
commission and the county fire department
and, with the standards, rules and regulations for subdivisions approved March 29,
1959, July 14, 1961 and subsequent thereto,
by the board of county commissioners, which
standards, rules and regulations are hereby
incorporated in this title by reference.
(Emphasis supplied).
*

(3)

*

*

Street Improvements.
*

*

*

(n) The subdivider shall install
curbs, gutters and sidewalks on existing and
proposed streets in all subdivisions, except
on the rear of such lots as back on major
streets not permitted access to such streets."
(Emphasis supplied).
*

*

*

Salt Lake County never solicited, invited or received any
bids to do any of the work or construction which would necessarily have to be done in order for the developer to make the
required subdivision improvements required by the County as a
condition for its approval of the proposed subdivision.

(R. 131).

The thing the County did do with reference to its approval of
said proposed subdivision was to have the developer guarantee
that the required improvements in fact would be installed within
a period of two years at the expense of the owner-developer.

The

developer did just that by signing the Agreement referred to
above.

(Copy of Agreement at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141).

The said Agreement was a performance bond or guarantee and not a
payment bond which the County never did require.

(R. 132).

Plaintiff-respondent was not paid for the concrete materials
by the subcontractor who ordered them and which were furnished
for the curb and gutter improvement in the said Larsen Estates
Phase III subdivision.

Plaintiff-respondent first sued the

subcontractor and later sued Salt Lake County for the value
thereof for which it was awarded judgment (R. 220) against the
County in the lower court.

Its contention is that the perfor-

mance guarantee which the County insisted upon and received in
the form of the Agreement hereinabove referred to was a "public
contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953,
then in effect (subsequently repealed by Laws of 1980, Ch. 75),
and accordingly, since the County did not require a "payment"
bond, the County thereby became liable to plaintiff-respondent
for the concrete materials it furnished and which were used in
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the curb and gutter improvements in the Larsen Estates Phase III
subdivision.
The crucial substantive issue for resolution by the Utah
Supreme Court is:
Did the governmental action taken by
Salt Lake County in requiring the developer
of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision
to guarantee that he, at his expense, would
install required improvements as a condition
for County approval of said developer's
proposed subdivision, constitute the awarding
of a "public contract11 within the purview of
Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, which would
require both a "performance" and a "payment"
bond?
Defendant-appellant respectfully submits that such governmental action on the part of Salt Lake County does not constitute
the awarding of a "public contract" within the purview of the
aforesaid Utah Code provision.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID STATE
A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT UPON WHICH
RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED.

The claim asserted by Concrete Products Company against Salt
Lake County in its Amended Complaint (R. 81-85) in essence is
that the Agreement (copy at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141) by
which the owner-developer of the proposed Larsen Estates Phase
III subdivision guaranteed unto Salt Lake County that he, at his
expense, would install the improvements which the County required
as a condition for its approval of said subdivision is in fact a
"public contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 1,
U.C.A. 1953, which would require besides the "performance bond"
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or guarantee which the County did require, in addition, a "paymentff bond which the County did not require.

Counsel for

Concrete Products Company reiterated this same claim to the lower
court at the trial when he argued:
"...plaintiff did not get paid for these
materials and so we have filed this lawsuit
seeking recovery from the County under a
specific statutory section set forth in Title
!l
14, Chapter 1 of the Utah Code
(R. 246).
The specific statutory provision referred to in the Amended
Complaint and the argument of counsel is embodied in Section
14-1-5 of the Utah Code which provides:
"Before any contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public
building or public work or improvement of...
any county...is awarded to any person, he
shall furnish to...such county...bonds which
shall become binding upon the award of the
contract to such person, who is hereinafter
designated as 'contractor1:
f

(1) A performance bond...said bond shall
be solely for the protection of the public
body awarding the contract.1
f

(2) A payment bond...solely for the
protection of persons supplying labor or
materials to the contractor or his subcontractors. . . . f" (Emphasis supplied).
If the assertion being made that the mere requirement, under
its police power, of a "performance11 bond or guarantee that
required improvements be installed before a proposed subdivision
development is approved by a political entity is in fact a
"public contract" within the purview of the aforesaid Utah Code
provision, it would be a chilling, devastating blow to all subdivision development throughout the entire state.

Furthermore,

it would constitute an unwarranted and unwanted intrusion into
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development and construction activities of all subdivision
developers.

Anytime a political entity required a "performance11

bond to guarantee performance of requirements imposed on subdivision developers for the health, safety and protection of the
public, the developer would have to advertise for bids, let
contracts for required subdivision improvements to the lowest
responsible bidder, etc., etc., as is statutorily required for
"public contracts".
Assume momentarily that the developer didn't install the
required subdivision improvements which he guaranteed he would
install.

Under this assumption he would have defaulted on his

guarantee.

Thereafter, the political entity would have looked to

the "performance" bond or guarantee; and, the political entity
thereafter would have advertised for bids as the Utah Code
mandates and then awarded a contract to the lowest responsible
bidder for the installation of the required subdivision improvements.

The award of a contract under such circumstances would

constitute the awarding of a "public contract" within the purview
of Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, which would have required
both a "performance" and a "payment" bond.

The mere requirement,

however, which Salt Lake County imposed on the developer of the
proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision, that he guarantee
unto the County that the required subdivision improvements be
installed before the County approved his proposed subdivision was
not the awarding of a "public contract".

An objective analysis

of the actual Agreement entered into between the County and the
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developer to guarantee performance by the developer of the
requirements imposed on the developer as a condition for the
approval of his proposed subdivision evidences that it is not a
"public contract".
The fact that Salt Lake County did not award a "public
contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953,
so as to make it liable to Concrete Products Company for not
having required a "payment1' bond as well as a "performance" bond
as a condition for the County's approval of the developer's
proposed subdivision would be crystal clear and unchallengeable
had the developer procured a "performance" bond issued by a
professional bonding company such as United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., which was one of the options of the developer under
Section 19-5-2 of the County Ordinances.

The County then would

not even be a party to the performance guarantee which the County
required the developer provide before it approved the developer's
proposed subdivision.

There in fact is no justifiable distinction

between the performance guarantee which was provided and to which
the County was a party, and, a performance guarantee which might
have been provided by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. as
above set forth.

No "public contract" within the purview of

Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, was awarded by Salt Lake
County.
Objectively considering the foregoing analysis, the Amended
Complaint simply doesn't state a claim against Salt Lake County
upon which relief can be granted.
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Point 2.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RULE THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANT WERE BARRED BY THE MANDATORY
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT, TITLE 63, CHAPTER 30,
U.C.A. 1953.

Salt Lake County, as a political entity of the State of
Utah, is immune from suit for the action it took in regulating
the proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision development,
which action gave rise to the claims of Concrete Products
Company.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, at all times

applicable to this case on appeal, provided in Section 63-30-3
thereof that:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in
this act, all governmental entities shall be
immune from suit for any injury which may
result from the activities of said entities
wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function.'1
The plain and simple fact is that, in this case, Salt Lake
County did nothing more than exercise one of its "governmental
functions" by regulating a proposed subdivision within its
territorial limits under the "police power" delegated unto it by
the Utah Legislature.

Salt Lake County did not enter into a so-

called "public contract".

Salt Lake County never at any time
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tried to promote or develop the proposed subdivision.

It never

advertised for or sought bids for the improvements it required as
a condition for its approval of said subdivision.

Salt Lake

County never awarded any contract "...for the construction,
alteration or repair of any public building or public work or
improvement of the...county...."

There was never any privity of

contract between Salt Lake County and the general contractor who
was engaged by the owner-developer of the proposed subdivision to
install the required improvements.
The only thing Salt Lake County in fact did do was to exercise the police power delegated unto it by the Utah Legislature
to control and regulate subdivisions within its jurisdiction by
requiring the developer, in lieu of completing the required
subdivision improvements before it gave its final approval to the
proposed subdivision, to guarantee that said improvements would
be completed within a period of two years.

The developer made

this guarantee by the Agreement which was entered into with the
County.

(R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141).

It's a warped,

twisted and tortured interpretation of plain, unambiguous
language to construe the developerfs guarantee set forth in that
Agreement as a so-called "public contract" within the purview of
Chapter 1 of Title 14, U.C.A. 1953, which would require not only
a "performance11 bond but also a "payment11 bond.
It is generally recognized that subdivision control, as a
part of land use regulation, is an acceptable part of the police
power reserved unto the states by the Tenth Amendment to the
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United States Constitution.

The Utah Legislature delegated

authority unto the several counties to impose subdivision controls on proposed subdivisions located within the unincorporated
areas of the respective counties by the provisions of Title 17,
Chapter 21, and the provisions of Title 57, Chapter 5, U.C.A.
1953, as amended.

Such controls, when established and enforced

to conserve and promote the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community, are usually upheld as constitutional over claims that the statutes violate due process
through a deprivation of land.

Mansfield and Swett, Inc. v.

Town of West Orange, 129 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225.

This court, in

speaking of the subdivision control authority which the Utah
Legislature delegated unto the political subdivisions of the
state, said in Ellis v. Hale, 13 U.2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, at page
384 of 373 P.2d:
"...the laws here involved have as their
object the intelligent and orderly development of the community...."
In the case of Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346, this
court held that Mapleton City was immune from a damage suit
involving its action pertaining to a proposed subdivision within
the city limits because such action was deemed a "governmental
function".

Also, in the case of Breitling Bros. Construction,

Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc. and the State of Utah, 597 P.2d
869, this court said at page 871 of 597 P.2d:
"...we can see no basis whatsoever upon which
to agree with plaintiff's contention that it
should be deemed that there was a contract
with the state of Utah by which it was
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obliged to require Golden Spikers to furnish
a bond to guarantee payment of laborers and
materialmen, as required by Sec. 14-1-5,
U.C.A. 1953."
As well as:
"The important point to note is that the
prerequisite to invoking the requirement of
those statutes [14-1-5 and 14-1-7] is that a
contract must be awarded."
It should be noted that the Breitling Bros, case, although the
contract being negotiated was never properly entered into,
involved a situation where State officials were in fact negotiating a contract for the removal of a race track at the Utah
State Fairgrounds and the installation of a soccer field.

Those

negotiations pertained to an "entreprenurial venture" wherein
revenue would be derived for and on behalf of the State.

The

situation involved in that case is in no way like the situation
involved in the instant case.

In the instant case, Salt Lake

County was not engaging in an "entreprenurial enterprise" but, on
the contrary, was merely exercising its delegated police power to
regulate a proposed subdivision.
The governmental activity engaged in by Salt Lake County in
regulating the proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision, is
analogous to the governmental activity engaged in by the State of
Utah in its regulation of a financial institution within the
state, which activity, this court, in the case of Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, held enjoyed "governmental immunity".
the course of its opinion, this Court held, speaking through
Justice Oaks, at page 631 of 658 P. 2d:
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In

"...we conclude that governmental supervision
of financial institutions is an activity fof
such a unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency....!
Standford, 605 P. 2d 1237.!!
"...the governmental activity in this case
qualifies as a 'governmental functionf".
In the instant case, the supervision and regulation of the
proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision by Salt Lake County
was an activity of such a unique nature it could only be performed by Salt Lake County under its delegated "police power",
and accordingly, the action the County took by requiring a
performance guarantee from the developer, qualifies as a !lgovernmental function" enjoying "governmental immunity".
Even assuming, arguendo, that the action which Salt Lake
County took in regulating the proposed Larsen Estates Phase III
subdivision was not a "governmental function" so as to make its
said action "immune" from liability, the lower court still should
have dismissed the Amended Complaint because of the failure of
Concrete Products Company to have complied with another mandatory
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; namely, Section
63-30-11, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which provided at all times
applicable to the instant case in pertinent part that:
"Any person having a claim...against a
governmental entity...shall, before maintaining an action under this act, file
written notice of claim with such entity
for appropriate relief....11 (Emphasis
supplied).
The record shows that the original Complaint was filed May 9,
1980.

(R. 2). However, the document which plaintiff-respondent

contends was its "notice of claim" (R. 151) , although dated
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May 9, 1980, was not in fact served on Salt Lake County until
May 12, 1980 (R. 151-152), three (3) days after the filing of the
Complaint.

In other words, contrary to the mandate of the

statute, the

,f

notice of claim" was given not before, but after,

the filing of the Complaint.
Finally, both claims set forth in the Amended Complaint
should have been dismissed by the lower court because of the
failure of Concrete Products Company to have complied with still
another provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; namely,
Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which provided at all
times applicable to the instant case in pertinent part as follows:
ff

A claim against a political subdivision is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with
the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the cause of
action arises."
The record shows conclusively that the concrete materials
for which Judgment (R. 220) was granted against Salt Lake County
in favor of Concrete Products Company were furnished on or before
May 11, 1979.

(R. 82, R. 131-2 and R. 216). These materials

were sold by Concrete Products Company not to Salt Lake County
but to David Pearce Construction, a subcontractor engaged by the
owner-developer of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision.
(R. 117 and 132). Accordingly, any claim or possible claim which
Concrete Products Company may have had against Salt Lake County
for the value of those materials arose on or before May 11, 1980.
However, the document which Concrete Products Company contends
was its "notice of claim" (plaintiff's Exhibit F attached to the
Pre-Trial Order - R. 151), although dated May 9, 1980, was not
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served on Salt Lake County, as evidenced on the face thereof and
by the Constable!s Return attached thereto, until May 12, 1980.
(R. 151-2).

The above referred to mandatory provision of the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act was not complied with by Concrete
Products Company.
The lower court, in its Memorandum Decision of December 13,
1983 (R. 189), and, based on its Conclusion of Law No. 14 signed
February 3, 1984 (R. 219), concluded and ruled that it was not
necessary to consider the "unjust enrichment11 claim which was
asserted by plaintiff-respondent for the first time when it filed
its Amended Complaint (R. 81-85) on July 6, 1983 (R. 81). This
ruling was not appealed by plaintiff-respondent.

However,

plaintiff-respondent, in its "Statement of Points on Which
Plaintiff-Respondent Intends to Rely on Appeal" (R. 234-5)
asserts in Point III (R. 235) that:
"The lower court erred by failing to determine that plaintiff is entitled to recover
the value of its concrete materials delivered
to Larsen Estates Subdivision for curb and
gutter improvements, to prevent Salt Lake
County from being unjustly enriched to the
detriment of plaintiff."
In view of this, defendant-appellant respectfully submits the
following response.
At the outset it is respectfully submitted that the ownerdeveloper of Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision may possibly
have been "unjustly enriched" by the concrete materials which
plaintiff-respondent furnished and which were used in the curbs
and gutters in that subdivision, but, on the contrary, that Salt
Lake County, as a political entity of the State of Utah, was not
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"unjustly enriched11.

The actual fact is that rather than having

been "unjustly enriched," the contrary is true.

This for the

reason that by accepting the proposed subdivision which the
owner-developer submitted to the County for approval, the County
thereby and thereafter became obligated to maintain and service,
for the benefit of the public, the said curbs and gutters; and *""
likewise, the County thereby and thereafter became exposed to
possible liability claims for damages proximately caused as a
result of any defects therein.

In the meantime, the owner-

developer greatly benefited because of the enhanced value inuring
to the lots in the proposed subdivision created by the actual
installation of said curbs and gutters therein.
Furthermore, this new claim for so-called "unjust enrichment" was long ago barred by the express provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Any such possible claim necessarily

arose before May 11, 1979, because it was prior to that date when
plaintiff-respondent furnished the goods and materials for which
it sought recovery against defendant-appellant.

This being the

case, plaintiff-respondent was obligated to file a notice of such
claim before May 11, 1980.

Section 63-30-11, U.C.A. 1953, of the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act, provides in pertinent part as
follows:
"Any person having a claim for injury to
person or property against a governmental
entity or its employee shall, before maintaining an action under this act, file a
written notice of claim with such entity for
appropriate relief including money damages...."
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No written notice of its newly asserted claim of "unjust enrichment11 was ever filed.
As to said claim asserted for the first time in the Second
Claim for Relief in its Amended Complaint filed July 6, 1983,
even assuming arguendo that it may have had merit, which defendant-appellant expressly denies, it nevertheless was long ago
barred by the statute of limitations because it was not filed
within one year after May 11, 1979, as mandated by the provisions
of Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, providing:
M

A claim against a political subdivision
is barred unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing body of the political
subdivision within one year after the cause
of action arises.11
Plaintiff-respondent!s new claim against Salt Lake County
for so-called "unjust enrichment" falls squarely within the
general rule set forth in 54 C.J.S., Sec. 281 - Introducing New
Cause of Action - which provides in pertinent part at page 335:
"...The general rule is that an amendment which introduces a new or different
cause of action and makes a new or different
demand does not relate back to the beginning
of the action, so as to stop the running of
the statute of limitations, but is the
equivalent of a fresh suit on a new cause of
action, so that the statute continues to run
until the amendment is filed...."
In like vein, see 51 Am.Jur. Sec. 218 - Effect of Substantial
Change - providing in pertinent part at page 776 that:
"Where an amendment does not merely
expand or amplify the initially filed pleadings, but introduces a new cause of action or
one which is different and distinct from the
one originally set up, the new pleading is
deemed equivalent to the bringing of a new
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action, and there is no relation back to the
filing of the original pleading which will
prevent the statute of limitations from
running against the new cause of action down
to the time it is introduced by the amendment. Thus, the statute of limitations will
bar an amended petition if it does not relate
back to the original cause of action, but
constitutes an entirely separate and distinct
claim and a substantial change therefrom.ff
The Supreme court of Missouri succinctly reiterated the
applicable rule of law in the case of McDaniel v. Lovelace, 439
S.W.2d 906, when it said at page 909:
"...The general rule is that an amendment will not relate back to the filing of
the original petition and save a cause of
action from the bar of the statute of limitations fif proof necessary to support the
pleading as amended is different from the
proof necessary to support the same pleading
before such amendment. . . . ' "
Point 3.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE ACTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN
REGULATING A PROPOSED SUBDIVISION UNDER
ITS DELEGATED POLICE POWER CONSTITUTED
THE ENTERING INTO A "PUBLIC CONTRACT"
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER
1, U.C.A. 1953, SO AS TO MAKE IT LIABLE
TO PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT FOR NOT REQUIRING A "PAYMENT B0ND,!.

In granting the Judgment (R. 220), which the lower court
did, in favor of Concrete Products Company against Salt Lake
County, the lower court came to the conclusion (which defendantappellant respectfully submits is erroneous) that the Agreement
(copy at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141), by which the developer
guaranteed that certain required subdivision improvements would
be installed, was a "public contract" within the purview of Title
14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953.

This conclusion was buttressed by
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another conclusion which the lower court made (which defendantrespondent respectfully submits is likewise erroneous) to the
effect that lien rights of materialmen were cut off by the action
which the County took so that accordingly the aforesaid Agreement
was a ''public contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter
1, U.C.A. 1953.

The foregoing analysis and conclusions made by

the lower court as a basis of its Judgment (R. 220) are set forth
in its Memorandum Decision of December 13, 1983 (R. 185-189),
which at R. 187 states in pertinent part:
"The critical question in this case is
whether a contract was awarded within the
meaning of the statute.
This statute was obviously intended to
apply primarily to the situation where a
public body contracts with a construction
company for the construction or repair of
public buildings, sewers, sidewalks or the
like. In this case the County did not contract directly to have the improvements
constructed. And the County did not pay for
them; not one cent of public money went to
construction of the improvements. Rather the
County required the developer to see to it
that the improvements were made. The County
could have required the developer to install
all of the off-site improvements prior to the
time that the subdivision was approved. If
it had done so the materialmen could have
filed a lien. The statutory scheme is such
that the protection of the bonding requirement should begin its protection where the
protection of the lien statute ends. In
other words if Salt Lake County, by accepting
the subdivision and requiring improvements
cut off the rights of materialmen to file a
lien, then the contract requiring the improvements should be construed to be a contract
award within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.,
Section 14-1-5 and a bond should have been
required.!f
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It is recognized that the provision of the Utah Code dealing
with mechanicfs liens precludes the filing of a mechanic's lien
which would be effective against public property.

In this con-

nection Section 38-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The provisions of this chapter shall not
apply to any public building, structure or
improvement."
However, the above quoted statutory provision does not mean that
the lien rights of Concrete Products Company were cut off in the
case on appeal merely because the concrete materials which
Concrete Products Company supplied were used for curbs and
gutters on property dedicated to public use by the owner-developer
of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision.

There is simply no

reason why Concrete Products Company, a division of Gibbons &
Reed, could not have filed a lien against the Larsen Estates
Phase III subdivision itself.

Such a lien, if properly filed,

would be effective against the private property within the
perimeters of the said subdivision.

There is no question but

that the curbs and gutters within the perimeters of the Larsen
Estates Phase III subdivision benefited all of the lots within
that subdivision.
During the argument at the trial of this case, counsel for
defendant-appellant tried to have the lower court examine some
certified copies of liens which had in fact been filed for record
with the County Recorder by G & R Contractor, a division of
Gibbons and Reed Company, for the concrete curb, gutter and sidewalk which said contractor had installed in another subdivision
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in Salt Lake County.

The reason counsel made such an offer was

to make it easier for the court to examine the certified copies
of the liens which already actually were on file in the County
Recorder's Office rather than have the court examine such documents as part of the public records on file in the Recorder's
Office.

The liens referred to above were both filed in the

County Recorder's Office on April 28, 1980, only one year after
Concrete Products Company, in this case on appeal, furnished the
concrete materials used in the curbs and gutters in the Larsen
Estates Phase III subdivision.

One of those liens appears as

Entry No. 3427546 in Book 5093 at Pages 858-860, and the other
appears as Entry No. 3427547 in Book 5093 at Pages 861-863.
The lien rights of Concrete Products Company simply were not
cut off by the action taken by Salt Lake County when it approved
the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision.
CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of the factual basis for the Judgment
which the lower court awarded against Salt Lake County, and, the
proper application of the prevailing law thereto, leads to the
only justifiable conclusion; namely, that said Judgment should be
reversed as a matter of law.
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Respectfully submitted,
TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
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